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a b s t r a c t
Recently, there has been increasing interest in determining which social network structures emerge as a
consequence of the conscious actions of actors.Motivated by the belief that “networksmatter” in reaching
personal objectives, it is a natural assumption that actors try to optimize their network position. Starting
from the notion that an optimal network position depends on the social context, we examine how actors
change their networks to reach better positions in various contexts. Distinguishing between three social
contexts (a neutral context, a context in which closed triads are costly, and a context in which closed
triads are beneﬁcial), theoretical results predict that emerging networks are contingent on the incentives
that are present in these contexts. Experiments are used to test whether networks that are theoretically
predicted to be stable are also stable experimentally. We ﬁnd that emerging networks correspond to a
large extent with the predicted networks. Consequently, they are contingent on the incentives present
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. Introduction
Over the past decades, there has been a growing interest in the
ffect of social networks on individual achievement and group per-
ormance. Driven by the belief that actors should not be regarded as
tomized individuals but instead as individuals embedded in social
elationships (Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1985),many studies have
hown that social structure affects important aspects of social
nd economic life. Examples include personal health (House et al.,
988), educational attainment (Coleman and Hoffer, 1987), ﬁnding
job (Granovetter, 1974), buyer satisfaction (DiMaggio and Louch,
998), ﬁrm performance (Uzzi, 1996), closing deals (Mizruchi and
tearns, 2001), the enforcement of social norms (Raub and Weesie,
990), and the promotion of civic engagement (Putnam, 2000).
The network literature has concentrated on what good network
ositions are at the individual level, and how network struc-
ure relates to the performance of groups at the collective level.
 We thank Jeroen Weesie, Werner Raub, two anonymous reviewers, and mem-
ers at different seminars in which this paper was presented for valuable comments
n earlier versions of this paper. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conﬂict
roject CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research
ixth Framework Programme. Additional funding was provided by Utrecht Univer-
ity through the High Potentials 2004 subsidy for the research program “Dynamics
f Cooperation, Networks, and Institutions.”
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 30 253 1848; fax: +31 30 253 4405.
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lthough these studies imply that individuals try to maneuver
hemselves into beneﬁcial network positions, the mechanisms
nderlying these processes have only been made explicit to a lim-
ted extent (Flap, 2004). Given the strategic value of networks, it is
mportant tounderstandhownetworks are formed (Jackson, 2005).
sing a dynamic point of view, we can illuminate how actors form
ies and how network structure evolves given the beneﬁts of net-
orkpositions (JacksonandWolinsky, 1996). Accordingly, the focus
hifts from networks as an independent variable (“consequences of
etworks”) to networks as a dependent variable (“causes of net-
orks”). Naturally, new questions arise. How do people change
heir networks in order to achieve better positions? When is a net-
ork stable, or when does no more change occur? Additionally, if
any networks are stable in a given context, which networks are
ore likely to emerge?
Recently, the literature on dynamic social networks has been
rowing considerably (see Doreian and Stokman (1997), Stokman
ndDoreian (2001) andBreiger et al. (2003) for extensiveoverviews
rom the point of view of sociology; see Jackson (2005) and Goyal
2007) for surveys from the economics literature). This study is
ost closely related to several game-theoretic models that deal
ith the emergence of networks and are used in economics as well
s sociology (e.g., Myerson, 1991; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala
nd Goyal, 2000; Johnson and Gilles, 2000; Gould, 2002; Goyal and
ega-Redondo, 2007; Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2008; Willer, 2007).
n these models, it is assumed that (1) actors derive utility from











































































































34 M.J. Burger, V. Buskens / So
nd (2) actors are able to strategically arrange their ties in order to
ptimize their expected utility (Jackson, 2006).
Most of the formal network formation models in the dynamic
etwork literature face three major drawbacks. First, the connec-
ion with “classic” theories of network structure and performance
s often nonexistent. The economists who developed most of
hese models often neglected the substantive knowledge of rel-
vant network characteristics that affect important aspects of
ocial and economic life as known to sociologists. Although the
ntegration of these subﬁelds is limited, noteworthy examples of
ross-fertilization are Cálvo-Armengol (2004), Goyal and Vega-
edondo (2007),Willer (2007), and Buskens andVandeRijt (2008).
econd, there are hardly any dynamic network studies that include
ystematic comparisons of social contexts in terms of network
ynamics. As incentives attached to particular network structures
ary across social contexts, we can also expect different emerg-
ng network structures across social contexts. Third, few empirical
ests of dynamic network models have been conducted so far.
xceptions in this respect include experiments conducted by Falk
nd Kosfeld (2003), Deck and Johnson (2004), Callander and Plott
2005), Berninghaus et al. (2006, 2007) and Goeree et al. (2008).
or a more extensive overview, see Kosfeld (2005). These experi-
ents, however, still hardly comparedifferent contexts. In addition,
hey mostly focus on one stable structure and pay less attention to
he likelihood of emergence of speciﬁc stable structures if multiple
table structures exist.
This article attempts to overcome some of the above-mentioned
uandaries in network formation models. By considering theories
fwell-knownbeneﬁtsofnetwork structuresderived fromthe soci-
logical literature, we hypothesize which networks will emerge
epending on the social context. We introduce three network for-
ation contexts: (1) a context in which closed triads are costly,1
2) a context in which closed triads are beneﬁcial, and (3) a neutral
ontext as a reference situation.2 Analytic calculations and com-
uter simulations, including the characterization of stable states in
ach context, are used to develop the theoretical framework and
erive hypotheses. Experiments are carried out to assess whether
merging networks are contingent on the incentives related to the
ocial context in which they are embedded, and to assess which
f the potentially stable networks are more likely to emerge in a
ynamic network process.
. Two alternative contexts for network formation
In his seminal work on the social structure of competition, Burt
1992) constructs a theory that envisages which positions in a
ocial network are most beneﬁcial (e.g., to obtain higher proﬁts, to
ain exclusive information, or to produce good ideas). Burt (1992)
ypothesizes that “structural holes” or brokerage positions, char-
cterized by the absence of ties among one’s network partners,
re most advantageous. In other words, an actor creates a com-
etitive advantage when there are no ties between his network
artners, and the actor is at the center of a star-shaped structure.
ccording toBurt, suchanetworkpositionprovides both access and
ontrol beneﬁts. First, brokerage positions offer maximum access
o information, while at the same time avoiding ties that procure
he same informational beneﬁts. Contacts that share ties among
ach other are likely to share the same information and are there-
1 A triad is deﬁned as a set of three actors in a particular network. In a closed triad,
ll three actors are connected with one another.
2 Clearly, other social contexts can be conceived. One context in which dynamic
etworks are studied in a relatedmanner is the context of social exchange networks.
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ore redundant. Second, bringing together non-redundant contacts
i.e., occupying a structural hole) gives control overwhose interests
re served when information is exchanged. Although Burt’s notion
f structural entrepreneurship implies that individuals attempt to
aneuver themselves into beneﬁcial positions, he does not elabo-
ate much on the mechanism underlying this process (cf. Buskens
nd Van de Rijt, 2008). We assume that actors deliberately manip-
late ties to improve the opportunity structure created by their
ocial relationships. In the “Burtian” model, actors strive to have
on-redundant ties, occupy brokerage positions, and bridge struc-
ural holes. In other words, actors maximize their utility by trying
o create ties with unconnected others.
In contrast, Coleman (1990) argues that, rather than structural
oles, network closure should be regarded as the most important
ource of social capital. According to Coleman, dense and cohe-
ive networks reduce the costs of information searches, promote
rust, and facilitate achieving norms. Similarly to Burt (1992), Cole-
an focuses on access and control beneﬁts. First, closure facilitates
ccess to information, thereby decreasing the costs of information
earch. Since the quality of information tends to decay in transit,
t is better to obtain this information with a minimum number of
ntermediaries. Second, network closure facilitates sanctions and
oming to agreements, thereby promoting trust and norms. In the
Colemanian” model, actors strive to create redundant ties and
losed triads. From a dynamic point of view, the optimal way to
orm ties is with connected others.
At ﬁrst glance, Burt and Coleman seem to represent two oppos-
ng views of the best way to form ties. However, this seeming
ontradiction should be called into question, since the context-
ependency of these different views is often overlooked when
omparing their strengths and weaknesses. As network effects
re goal-speciﬁc, structural advantage may vary depending on the
articular situation (Podolny and Baron, 1997; Flap and Völker,
001; see also Burt, 2005). Accordingly, the effect of network posi-
ion on social and economic outcomes is context-dependent, since
ncentives differ across situations. Enforcing norms and promot-
ng safety works better in a dense structure than in a structure
ich in structural holes. When searching for a job, “weak ties” are
ore beneﬁcial than “strong ties” (Granovetter, 1973), where weak
ies are often ties to people who do not have contacts with other
ontacts of the focal actor. Obviously, these system-level phenom-
na (social contexts) can be expected to inﬂuence systemoutcomes
network structure) through their effect on individual orientations
nd actions. The resulting network structure cannot be perceived
s a direct result ofmacro-differences, but is a byproduct of individ-
al behavior. Actors do not directly strive for dense, decentralized,
r segmented networks, but optimize only their individual net-
ork positions. Therefore, we consider network formation as a
acro–micro–macro process (see Coleman, 1990) encompassing
he uncoordinated sum of individuals’ actions originating from the
ptimization of each actor’s network position.
. Theoretical framework and hypotheses: network
ormation and stability
.1. Network formation contexts and utility functions
This section describes our model. Each network position of an
ctor i in a network g represents a utility ui(g). As a baseline, we
ntroduce a neutral context in which actors establish ties with-
ut preference for whether network partners are related or not.
ater, the model is expanded to contexts in which actors prefer ties
ith unconnected others (Burtian context) and contexts in which


















































































































From this, it follows that actor i desires an additional tie if andM.J. Burger, V. Buskens / So
ctors are assumed to be homogeneous within a given context,
hile preferential attachment is only based on the ties others have.
hus, other actor characteristics (such as an actor’s resources) are
eglected in the network formation process. The costs and beneﬁts
re the same for each actor, and utility functions only vary across
ontexts.
A network g is composed of actors, represented by n nodes, and
he relationships between these actors, represented by t ties. Let
= {1, 2, . . ., n} be the ﬁnite set of actors, and tij the value of the tie
etweenactors iand j.Weconsider ties tobenon-reﬂexive (tii =0 for
ll i), non-directed (tij = tji for all i, j), and non-weighted (tij ∈ {0,1}).
iven these conditions, the set of all possible networks is {g|g ⊆
0,1}n(n−1)/2}. We denote the tie between i and j by ij. If ij∈ g, actors
and j are directly connected in the network g. If ij /∈ g, this is not
he case. The addition of a tie ij to a network g can be denoted by
+ ij, while the deletion of a tie ij results in the network g− ij.
Below, we distinguish three utility functions. First, we assume
hat utility only depends on the number of ties an actor i has:
i(g) =ui(ti), where ti =
∑
j /= itij . An actor is willing to form or hold
tie if and only if the marginal beneﬁts of that tie outweigh its
arginal costs. This context is called neutral. When actors form
ies in a neutral context, an actor i’s costs (C) and beneﬁts (B) are
nly affected by his own ti ties and are not related to ties between
ther actors. The utility of an actor i in a neutral context is therefore
resented by: ui(ti) =B(ti)−C(ti).
Assuming that tie beneﬁts and costs are linear (B(ti) =b1ti and
(ti) = c1ti), an actor makes any tie if b1 > c1, or does not make any
ie if c1 >b1. However, since actors have to divide their attention
ver all their relationships, it can be argued that the marginal costs
f an extra tie are an increasing function of ti (an equivalent model
merges if marginal beneﬁts of ties are a decreasing function of ti):
(ti) = c1ti + c2t2i . If beneﬁts are still linear, B(ti) =b1t1, this implies
hat actors face capacity constraints. Actors are willing to form ties
s long as the marginal beneﬁts are larger than or equal to the
arginal costs of ties. The resulting utility function for the neutral
ontext is: ui(ti) = b1ti − c1ti − c2t2i .
Next, we deﬁne two utility functions in which actors have pref-
rences on the relationships between other actors. In the “Burtian”
ontext, actors prefer ties with unconnected other actors: they
trive to bridge structural holes and try to avoid having redundant
ontacts. In other words, an actor i with a number of closed tri-
ds zi incurs additional costs. Assuming that costs for closed triads
re linear in zi, utility in the Burtian context can be represented by
i(ti, zi) = b1ti − c1ti − c2t2i − c3zi. It is worthwhile to note that zi is
ot independent of the number of ties ti actor i has. Clearly, ti poses
he upperbound ti(ti −1)/2 on the number of closed triads zi that
ctor i can be involved in.
It holds true in the Burtian context that actors form ties as long
s the marginal costs of ties are not larger than the marginal ben-
ﬁts. However, if the creation of an extra tie results in one or more
losed triads for actor i, then the marginal costs are larger than
hey would be in the neutral context. The utility function for the
urtian context is an adjusted version of the original constraint
easure constructed by Burt (1992), which should be perceived as
measure of the absence of brokerage opportunities: the lower
he constraint, the higher the adjacent utility. Compared to the
riginal formula, the above-mentioned utility function is simpli-
ed by considering the absence of closed triads in the same way
s having only non-redundant ties. Although it is questionable to
se such a crude measure of structural autonomy, the beneﬁt of
his simpliﬁcation is that it allows the utility function to be oper-
tionalized in an experimental setting more easily. The formula
losely resembles Burt’s network constraint, as it comprises the
otions that: (1) it is beneﬁcial to add ties as long as these ties
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haring more closed triads; and (3) brokerage opportunities are
erived from direct contacts only and not from indirect contacts.
uskens and Van de Rijt (2008) show that these are the crucial
roperties of the utility function for predicting which network will
merge in a dynamic context. In contrast to Burt (1992), Goyal and
ega-Redondo (2007) propose amodel inwhich indirect brokerage
pportunities are as important as direct brokerage opportunities.
lthough both assumptions are quite extreme, we focus here on
irect brokerage beneﬁts alone for three reasons. First, because this
easure is closer to Burt’s original measure of brokerage and Burt
2007) shows empirically that the beneﬁts of indirect brokerage are
ikely to be limited. Second, the networks in our experiment are
elatively small (six nodes), which means that there are relatively
ew indirect brokerage opportunities. Third, the implementation of
ndirect brokerage opportunities into an experiment would con-
iderably complicate the explanation of the utility function to the
xperimental subjects.
The third context is the “Colemanian” context in which actors
refer ties with connected other actors, thereby striving for closed
riads. More formally, an actor i with a number of closed triads zi
ields additional beneﬁts b2zi. This leads to the following utility
unction: ui(ti, zi) = b1ti + b2zi − c1ti − c2t2i .
Again, actors are willing to form ties as long as the marginal
osts of ties are not larger than the marginal beneﬁts of these ties.
owever, when the creation of an extra tie results in one or more
losed triads for actor i, this creates extra utility and, therefore,
here is a potential to create more ties than in the neutral context.
ence, we expect different network dynamics across the various
ontexts.
.2. Analytic results
Given the utility functions for the three contexts, and assum-
ng that actors attempt to maximize their utility, we can identify
ow many ties actors are willing to form. We specify the number
f ties actors create under the different functions. The marginal
osts of an additional tie (MCt) are equal toC(ti + 1) − C(ti) = c1(ti +
) + c2(ti + 1)2 − (c1ti + c2t2i ), where ti is i’s number of ties.Wenow
erive equations for how many ties actors want in each context.
In the neutral context, actors form ties as long as MCt ≤b1,
.e., c1(ti + 1) + c2(ti + 1)2 − (c1ti + c2t2i ) ≤ b1. From this, it can be
educed that an actor i wishes to add an additional tie if and only
f ti < (b1 − c1 − c2)/2c2. Clearly, an actor can only add a tie if there is
nother actor to whom he is not yet connected and who also wants
n additional tie.
In the Burtian context, actors want to form ties as long as
Ct +MCz ≤b1, where MCz is the marginal cost of a newly formed
losed triad. This implies that when an additional tie results in the
reation of zi closed triads, an actorwishes to add the tie provided
hat c1(ti + 1) + c2(ti + 1) − (c1ti + c2t2i ) + c3zi ≤ b1. Accordingly,
n actor i wants to create an additional tie if and only if, ti <
b1 − minjc3zi − c1 − c2)/2c2 ties, where minj zi is the mini-
um number of additional closed triads i can create by adding one
ie. Ceteris paribus, this implies that actors in the Burtian context
orm fewer ties than actors in the neutral context.
In the Colemanian context, an actor forms ties until
Ct ≥b1 +MCz, where MBz is the marginal beneﬁts of a newly
ormed closed triad. This implies that when the addition of a tie
esults in thecreationofzi closed triads, anactorwishes toadd the
ie if and only if c1(ti + 1) + c2(ti + 1)2 − (c1ti + c2t2i ) ≤ b1 + b2zi.nly if ti < (b1 + maxjb2zi − c1 − c2)/2c2, where minj zi is the
aximum number of additional closed triads i can make by adding
ne tie. Therefore, compared to actors in a neutral or Burtian














































































































u6 M.J. Burger, V. Buskens / So
.3. Network stability
Having speciﬁed how actors change their networks to reach
etter positions, we turn to network stability. The most common
tability concept proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is pair-
ise stability. In pairwise stable networks, there is no actor who
esires to sever a tie and no pair of actors that would like to add a
ie between themselves. Formally, this boils down to the following
wo conditions:
A network g is pairwise stable if (I) for all i and
j∈ g,ui(g)≥ui(g− ij); and (II) for all ij∈ g, if ui(g) <ui(g+ ij) then
j(g) >uj(g+ ij).
Given that tie deletion is considered to be unilateral and tie
ddition bilateral, the concept of pairwise stability considers only
ne-tie deviations (Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2008; Jackson, 2006).
lthough the concept of pairwise stability can be adapted in several
ays to account formultiple-tie deviations (e.g., strict pairwise sta-
ility (Gilles and Sarangi, 2008); unilateral stability (Buskens and
an de Rijt, 2008)), these adaptations hardly change the set of sta-
le networks in the contexts considered here. The conditions for
airwise stable networks follow directly from the conditions for
he willingness to add and remove ties as speciﬁed above, i.e., if
ll actors do not have more than their preferred number of ties
nd if no pair of actors who would like to add a tie is able to
o so, then the network is stable. Hence, pairwise stability is a
etwork property rather than an individual property. Below, we
ill see that there are multiple stable networks in each context.
ombining simulations with the experimental evidence, we try to




Wenow identify the stable networks across the various contexts
or our experimental manipulation. In order to do so, all possible
on-isomorphic networks with 6 actors are surveyed. Beneﬁts b1
nd costs c1 are ﬁxed at 1 and 0.2, respectively, while the capac-
ty constraints are varied via the quadratic costs of ties (c2). These
uadratic costs of ties take thevalues0.10 (lowcapacity constraints)
nd 0.20 (high capacity constraints). With respect to the Burtian
nd Colemanian contexts, respectively, the costs and beneﬁts of a
losed triad are considered to be linear and ﬁxed at c3 =b2 =0.20
er closed triad.
To derive hypotheses about the effects of context on emerging
etwork structures,weusedensity, proportionof closed triads, cen-
ralization, and segmentation as the characteristics to describe the
etworks. These network characteristics include all the main char-
cteristics to distinguish between the stable networks that emerge
n the contexts studied here, and are sufﬁcient to uniquely identify
ny network with six actors. Moreover, it is expected that networks
merging in different social contexts differ on these dimensions.
ensity is deﬁned as the proportion of existing ties in a net-
ork (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Density and the proportion of
losed triads can both be regarded as measures of network closure.
owever, it is important to make a distinction between the two
easures. Actors that strive to bridge structural holes do not nec-
ssarily shun dense networks, but do avoid the creation of closed
riads. In other words, actors that form ties in a Burtian context
ant as many ties as possible as long as an additional tie does
ot result in the creation of one or more closed triads. These net-
orks can be rather dense. Alternatively, actors in the Colemanian
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mall closed subgroups while the overall network density is not
hat dense.
Centralization is deﬁnedas the standarddeviationof thepropor-
ion of ties (number of ties divided by the number of other actors
n the network) each individual actor has (see Snijders, 1981). The
easure is standardized such that all values lie between 0 and 1,
here the most centralized network (the ‘star’) has the value 1.
entralization expresses the presence of structural inequality or
nevenness in the network by measuring the extent to which the
etwork resembles a star-shaped structure. In the Burtian context,
ll actors would like to be the center of the network; centraliza-
ion indicates whether some actors actually succeed in becoming
entral.
Segmentation is deﬁned as the proportion of dyads with a dis-
ance of at least 3, out of all dyads that have a distance of at least 2
Baerveldt and Snijders, 1994). All disconnected dyads are assumed
o have a distance larger than 3. Networks with a maximal distance
f 2 between two actors are not segmented at all and are assigned a
alue of 0. Segmentation reﬂects the extent towhich the network is
artitioned into strongly connected subgroups. By measuring seg-
entation, we can identify whether closed subgroups emerge in
he Colemanian context if tie costs are high.
The simulation consists of two steps. First, we check which net-
orks are pairwise stable. In addition, we evaluate the network
tructure for the stable networks in each context. Although this
nalysis provides an overview of all pairwise stable networks, it
oes not indicate which stable networks are more likely to occur
han others. For this reason, it is impossible to draw exact hypothe-
es about the “average” predicted network structures across the
arious contexts.
Second, we examine the network formation process by starting
rom an empty network and letting actors add and sever ties until
onvergence, that is, until a pairwise stable state is reached. In the
xperiment, we also start from the empty network. In this simula-
ion, a random actor is chosen in each period. This actor changes
ne tie in order to gain the maximum increase in his utility, taking
nto account that if he would like to add a tie, the other actor must
ot object. Thus, we apply a kind of myopic best-response in which
ctors are constrained, in the sense that they can change one tie at
ost. By letting this simulation run 200 times in all experimental
onditions (which are deﬁned by context and capacity constraints),
e are able to deduce the probability that a network will con-
erge to a speciﬁc pairwise stable network in a particular network
ormation context. This not only provides us with a baseline like-
ihood for a speciﬁc pairwise stable network to emerge in a given
ontext, it also allows us to estimate, e.g., the expected density or
entralization of emerging networks in each context.
We focus on networks of size 6 because this magnitude can
e considered “a size reﬂecting a trade-off between capturing net-
ork complexity while maintaining manageability” (Callander and
lott, 2005: 1473). A network should be large enough (in terms of
he number of actors and the potential number of ties) to observe
ifferences between conditions and contexts, but testing hypothe-
es based on a relatively large network might make it difﬁcult
or subjects to gain a clear view of the “physical” network dur-
ng the experimental test, resulting in coordination problems and
on-random error.
With respect to the quadratic costs, we focus on two levels:
ow (c2 =0.10) and high (c2 =0.20) capacity constraints. Whereas
nder high capacity constraints actors want to form a maximum
f two ties in the neutral context, this amounts to four ties under
ow capacity constraints. The choice for these two speciﬁc levels of
uadratic costs is based on the premise of scrutinizing two sig-
iﬁcantly different conditions in which there is more than one
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ext. We control for “random error” in goal-directed behavior by
unning the simulations at different levels of “noise,” as this can
xplain the discrepancies between the expected and observed net-
ork structures. Noise is implemented as the proportion of random
ie changes rather than goal-directed changes as indicated above,
nd can take the values 0.10 (low), 0.40 (average), or 0.70 (high).
n this way, we ensure that we do not obtain predictions that are
peciﬁc to a deterministic version of the model while testing it in
n experimental context in which subjects occasionally make mis-
akes. Possible discrepancies between the expected and observed
robabilities of convergence toward a particular stable network are
nalyzed by looking at different levels of noise. We consider a sim-
lation as converged if during a period in which a goal-directed
hange could have been made, no pair of actors wanted to change
heir ties. The simulations converged under all experimental con-
itions. These conditions were chosen in such a way that (1) they
omprised themost salient differences between contextswhile still
eing experimentallymanageable, and (2) thehypotheses speciﬁed
eloware representative for othernetwork sizes, startingnetworks,
nd capacity constraints. In particular, we ran many more simu-
ations using more values of the size of the networks, costs and
eneﬁts of ties, and costs and beneﬁts of closed triads. The experi-
ental conditions are representative in the sense that they include
ariations that cover the most relevant variations in outcomes in
ll our simulations.
.2. Simulation results and hypotheses
Fig. 1displaysall pairwise stablenetworks for the threecontexts.
nder low capacity constraints, there are eight different pairwise
table networks. For the neutral context, these are the tailed full
entagon, single-crossed 3-prism, octahedron, and the full pen-
agon with one isolated actor. For the Burtian context, the stable
etworks are the 2,4-complete bipartite network, 3,3-complete
ipartite network, and the 3-prism. For the Colemanian context,
here are only two pairwise stable networks under low capac-
ty constraints: the full hexagon and the full pentagon with one
solated actor. Under high capacity constraints, there are six differ-
nt pairwise stable networks. We often ﬁnd under this condition
imilar stable networks across the three contexts because the con-
traint on the number of ties becomes relatively more important
han the triads. For the neutral context, the pairwise stable net-
orks are the two triangles, the square and dyad, the pentagon and
solate, and the hexagon. In the Burtian context, there are three
airwise stable networks: the square and dyad, the pentagon and
solate, and the hexagon. In the Colemanian context, there are ﬁve
airwise stable networks: the full pentagon and isolate, the full
quare and dyad, two triangles, the pentagon and isolate, and the
exagon.
We not only want an overview of the stable networks, but also
ish to know which stable networks are more likely to occur
han others. These predictions are derived from the simulation
onducted by the procedure described above. Table 1 shows the
robability of convergence towards a particular stable network by
apacity constraint and context. We compare noise levels of 0.10,
.40, and0.70. However, the variation in outcomes is limited for dif-
erent noise levels. Therefore, we can safely use the average noise
evel of 0.40 to derive our hypotheses below.
Taking a closer look at the stable networks, we can identify
hich networks are equal and/or efﬁcient. By “equal” we meanhat every actor has the same net beneﬁt in the network, and by
efﬁcient” we mean that the sum of the net beneﬁts in the net-
ork is the highest among all networks. If we then look at Table 1,
e observe that certainly in the Colemanian and Burtian context,
he networks that are both equal and efﬁcient are more likely to
H
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merge than the other stable networks. In the neutral context with
ow capacity constraints, there does not seem to be one network
hat emerges much more often than all the others. In the neutral
ontext with high capacity constraints, only one of the two equal
nd efﬁcient networks emerges more frequently than all the other
table networks, which is the hexagon.
On the basis of the simulations described above, we hypothe-
ize the extent to which the emerging networks and the resulting
etwork characteristics are contingent on the social contexts. This
s done by comparing the mean network characteristics across the
ix network formation conditions. These predicted mean network
haracteristics are derived from the characteristics of the identiﬁed
airwise stable networks together with the probability of conver-
ence to a particular stable state in a given context, assuming a
0% noise level. For example, in the Colemanian context under low
apacity constraints, the full hexagon accounts for 86% of the mean
etwork characteristics and the full pentagon for 14% (based on
heir probability of occurrence). Table 2 shows the predicted mean
ensity, proportion of closed triads, centralization, and segmenta-
ion by capacity constraint and context.
Equality of means for the selected network characteristics (den-
ity, proportion of closed triads, centralization, and segmentation)
cross the three contexts by capacity constraint was tested using
regression analysis predicting network characteristics using the
ix conditions. Wald tests were used to test the equality of the
oefﬁcients for the network characteristics in these analyses. If
ifferences are not signiﬁcant for 200 simulation runs, they can
lso be expected to not be signiﬁcant in the limited number of
xperimental runs we present below. Accordingly, we rank each
etwork formation context by its capacity constraints for each of
he fournetwork characteristics. The resultinghypotheses are given
elow. Some hypotheses are more self-evident than others. More
peciﬁcally, the proportion of closed triads can be perceived as a
irect product of goal-directed or rational behavior. “If actors want
ananas, they buy bananas” (if they are able to pay for them and
ecognize what bananas are). In other words, given that Colema-
ian actors strive for closed triads, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd
high proportion of closed triads in the emerging network struc-
ures. On the contrary, centralization and segmentation are merely
byproduct of these actions. In other words, they are unintended
onsequences of goal-directed behavior, and the hypotheses below
re less obvious.
ypothesis 1. Density (d) in the different conditions is ordered as
ollows:
Low capacity constraints: d(Burtian, low) <d(neutral,
low) <d(Colemanian, low)
High capacity constraints: d(Burtian, high) =d(neutral,
high) <d(Colemanian, high)
ypothesis 2. The proportion of closed triads (ft) in the different
onditions is ordered as follows:
Low capacity constraints: ft(Burtian, low) < ft(neutral,
low) < ft(Colemanian, low)
High capacity constraints: ft(Burtian, high) = ft(neutral,
high) < ft(Colemanian, high)ypothesis 3. Centralization (c) in the different conditions is
rdered as follows:
Low capacity constraints: c(Burtian, low) < c(Colemanian,
low) < c(neutral, low)




























iig. 1. (A) Pairwise stable networks under low capacity constraints (networks are st
apacity constraints (networks are stable in the contexts mentioned in parentheses
High capacity constraints: c(Colemanian, high) = c(neutral,
high) = c(Burtian, high)
ypothesis 4. Segmentation (s) in the different conditions is
rdered as follows:
Low capacity constraints: s(Burtian, low) = s(neutral,
low) < s(Colemanian, low)
High capacity constraints: s(Burtian, high) < s(neutral,
high) < s(Colemanian, high)
The predicted network characteristics are based on the assump-
ion that pairwise stable networks emergewith a similar likelihood
n theexperimentas in thecomputer simulations.However, empiri-
al ﬁndings fromother dynamic network experiments indicate that
etworks that are theoretically predicted to be stable are not neces-
arily stable in an experiment. For example, Falk andKosfeld (2003)
how that fairness considerations play an important role in the net-





an the contexts mentioned in parentheses). (B) Pairwise stable networks under high
f payoff inequality on a subject’s desire to have the same ties as in
he previous period. This implies that networks need to be fairness-
ompatible in order to be stable. In a more recent experiment,
erninghaus et al. (2006, 2007) obtain similar results. Not only do
hey conclude that subjects tend to equalize payoffs in the experi-
ent, but they also observe sacriﬁcial behavior in order to achieve
qual outcomes, destabilizing unequal networks that are theoreti-
ally predicted to be stable. Callander and Plott (2005) ﬁnd that in a
etwork formation experiment in which the predicted strict Nash
quilibria provide equal payoffs for the actors, these networks are
ndeed likely to emerge. Efﬁciency does not turn out to be a crite-
ion determining network formation in the study of Callander and
lott (2005). One limitation of Callander and Plott (2005), however,
s that they do not provide a baseline for the likelihood that a net-
ork formation process converges to a particular stable network.
n the contrary, our simulation provides baseline probabilities for
he likelihood that particular pairwise stable networks emerge and,
herefore, we can test whether a simple best-response mechanism
s used in the simulation can predict the likelihood of emergence
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Table 1
Probability of convergence to a particular pairwise stable network by capacity constraint, network formation, context, and noise level (including indicators forwhich networks
are equal and/or efﬁcient).
Network Equal Efﬁcient Low noise level (0.10) Average noise level (0.40) High noise level (0.70)
Low capacity constraints
Neutral context
Tailed full pentagon 0.225 0.220 0.345
Single-crossed 3-prism 0.425 0.400 0.295
Octahedron × × 0.215 0.340 0.345
Full pentagon and isolate 0.135 0.040 0.015
Burtian context
2,4-Complete bipartite 0.140 0.070 0.070
3,3-Complete bipartite × × 0.735 0.620 0.495
3-Prism × 0.125 0.310 0.435
Colemanian context
Full hexagon × × 0.720 0.860 0.875
Full pentagon and isolate 0.280 0.140 0.125
High capacity constraints
Neutral context
Two triangles × × 0.165 0.140 0.125
Square and dyad 0.190 0.110 0.130
Pentagon and isolate 0.215 0.190 0.205
Hexagon × × 0.430 0.560 0.540
Burtian context
Square and dyad 0.190 0.160 0.205
Pentagon and isolate 0.225 0.205 0.235
Hexagon × × 0.585 0.635 0.560
Colemanian context

































HFull square and dyad × 0.035
Two triangles × × 0.645
Hexagon × 0.170
Pentagon and Isolate 0.150
f a particular network, or whether equality and efﬁciency criteria
lso play a role. Still, we are not able to strongly disentangle the
wo arguments because equality and efﬁciency often co-occur in
ur stable networks, as can be seen in Table 1.
. Experimental design and method of analysis
.1. Experimental method
Where computer simulations were used in the previous sec-
ion to predict which (stable) network structures are most likely to
merge, we now investigate the formation of networks by letting
ubjects participate in a computerized network experiment. In this
ay we can test whether the networks that are theoretically pre-
icted to be stable are indeed stable in the laboratory and, if so,
hether the simulation process might reﬂect how subjects reach
hese stable networks.
An obvious advantage of using laboratory experiments is the











Neutral context 0.75 (0.04) 0.36 (0.05)
Burtian context 0.60 (0.02) 0.03 (0.05)
Colemanian context 0.95 (0.12) 0.93 (0.17)
igh capacity constraints
Neutral context 0.38 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
Burtian context 0.38 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00)




osts of tie formation, increasing the internal validity of the study.
eck and Johnson (2004) stress the importance of keeping the
ask understandable and non-demanding for subjects in order to
afeguard the construct validity. This need for comprehensibility
alidates our choice of the relatively straightforward utility func-
ions. In addition, other measures were taken to facilitate a valid
nterpretationof theexperimental data. The instructions contained,
or instance, an extensive task description including examples and
ayoff matrices to give a brief synopsis of the costs and beneﬁts for
ach context according to the number of ties created (see Appendix
for the English translation of the complete instructions). Subjects
ould familiarize themselves with the system during four practice
ounds. However, oversimplifying tasks would also have a nega-
ive impact on the validity of the research as this would induce a
phere of artiﬁciality (Judd et al., 1990). When conducting a labora-
ory experiment, it is important tomake sure thatwhatwemeasure
s really what we intend to measure. To what extent are the con-
tructs of theoretical interest successfully operationalized? To put
t differently, are subjects sufﬁciently aware that they are involved
acity constraint and network formation context (standard deviation in parentheses
losed triads Centralization Segmentation
0.31 (0.26) 0.04 (0.20)
0.04 (0.16) 0.00 (0.00)
0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35)
0.13 (0.21) 0.51 (0.25)
0.15 (0.21) 0.44 (0.17)
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n a network formation process and do they act in an appropriate
ay, or are they just occupied with maximizing payoffs (whether
r not due to trial and error)? The latter can be the case when the
ask to be executed in the laboratory is too difﬁcult or too easy.
ur study tries to ﬁnd a compromise between incomprehension
nd oversimpliﬁcation by presenting subjects with a simpliﬁed but
bstract environment in which the formulated hypotheses on net-
ork formation are tested.
.2. Experimental setting: treatments and conditions
In the experiment, subjects had to construct networks in the
hree social contexts (neutral, Burtian, and Colemanian) under one
f the two capacity constraints. In every context, subjects had to
nteract with ﬁve other participants. Starting from an empty net-
ork, they could add and delete ties for a limited amount of time in
rder to improve their network position. Under low capacity con-
traints, the beneﬁts per tiewere equal to 100 points,whereas costs
ncreased more than proportionally: 20t+10t2 points, in which t
epresents the number of ties an actor has. The beneﬁts per closed
riad in the Colemanian context were 20 points, as were the costs
er closed triad in the Burtian context. Under the high capacity con-
traint, thebeneﬁts per tiewere200points,while the costswere set
t 40t+40t2 points. In this condition, the beneﬁts per closed triad in
heColemanian contextwere40points. Likewise, the costsper triad
ere 40 points in the Burtian context. In the neutral context, four
ies lead to an optimal amount of points under low capacity con-
traints, while two ties are optimal under high capacity constraints.
ubjects earn 160 points in both situations. In the Burtian context
ith low capacity constraints, the best position an actor can reach
s having four ties without any closed triads, which amounts to 160
oints as well. However, it is impossible for all actors to simulta-
eously have four ties without closed triads. It is possible that all
ctors could have three ties without having closed triads, which
ould give them 150 points each. In the Burtian context with high
apacity constraints, everyone wants to have a maximum of two
ieswithout any closed triads. This gives everyone 160 points again.
n the Colemanian context with low capacity constraints, everyone
aximizes payoffs by having ﬁve ties and ten closed triads, earn-
ng everyone 350 points. Finally, in the Colemanian context with
igh capacity constraints, actors earn the same number of points
y having three ties with three closed triads or four ties with six
losed triads. Both situations give them240 points. Neither optimal
ituation can be reached by all six subjects in the network. There-
ore, subjects might settle for two closed triads in which everyone
arns 200 points. Although the composition and absolute magni-
ude of the payoffs vary across conditions and contexts, the relative
agnitudes of the payoffs are always in accordance with the utility
unctions used in the computer simulation..3. Experimental procedures
The computerized experiment was designed using the software







verview of order of conditions per session.
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mental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics (ELSE) at Utrecht
niversity. In total, six experimental sessions of approximately
ne-and-a-half hours were scheduled and completed, three using
ach condition (low or high capacity constraint). Using the ORSEE
ecruitment system (Greiner, 2004), over 250 potential subjects
ere approached by e-mail to participate in the experiment. Even-
ually, 18 students participated in each session, for a total of 108
eparate subjects in six sessions. Each session consisted of three
reatments (neutral, Burtian, andColemanian). Lowandhighcapac-
ty constraints as well as the order of the treatments were varied
etween sessions. General instructions were given before the start
f the experiment.
Table 3 provides the overview of the order of conditions within
ach session. Within each treatment, subjects played a network
ormation game three times under the same conditions. These
hree repetitions are called cycles. At the beginning of each cycle,
ubjects were randomly allocated to a group together with ﬁve
ther participants and assigned a label (P1, P2, . . ., P6). Par-
icipants were not identiﬁable between different cycles. In this
ashion, we minimized the dependence across observations (Falk
nd Kosfeld, 2003). Taking the three treatments together, every
ubject played a network formation game in nine different groups.
ltogether, the emergence of 162 networks was surveyed, i.e. (6
essions times 18 subjects per session times 3 treatments times
cycles) divided by (6 subjects per network) gives 162 net-
orks.
Each cycle had the same structure and was divided into 10
eriods of 30 s each. Starting from an empty network in the ﬁrst
eriod of every cycle, subjects indicated simultaneously on their
omputer terminals with whom they wished to establish or break
tie. As assumed in our models, mutual consent was needed
o form a tie, while subjects could unilaterally delete ties. After
wo subjects had indicated that they both wanted a tie with
ach other, the established ties appeared on the screen as red
ouble arrows. Full information about the network was contin-
ously provided. Also, tie proposals and ties created by other
articipants could instantly be observed. After each period, an
pdate of the entire network was displayed at the bottom of
he screen. In addition, subjects were informed about the num-
er of points earned with the network formed in that period.
screenshot of the subject screen (the screenshot is from the
urtian context with high capacity constraints) is displayed in
ig. 2.
The maximum payoffs were 19,800 points for subjects in
he low capacity constraint condition and 16,800 points for
ubjects in the high capacity constraint condition. At the end
f the experiment, the points were converted to euros at a
ate of 1000 points = D0.84 for subjects in the low capacity
onstraint condition and 1000 points = D1.00 in the high capac-
ty constraint condition. Additionally, subjects received a D2.50
articipation fee. The maximum payoff (that is, excluding the
articipation fee) earned by a subject was D15.80, while the
inimum amount was D10.80. On average, subjects obtained
14.20.












































to avoid the creation of closed triads.
Most converged networks (114 out of 130 networks, 87.7%)were
one of the pairwise stable networks. In the neutral context and in
the Burtian context under high capacity constraints, the converged
network was a pairwise stable network in 100% of cases. Only in
Table 4
Proportion converged networksa and pairwise stable networks by network forma-





networks that are also
pairwise stable
Low capacity constraints
Neutral context 0.82 (22 of 27) 1.00 (22 of 22)
Burtian context 0.52 (14 of 27) 1.00 (14 of 14)
Colemanian context 0.93 (25 of 27) 0.60 (15 of 25)
High capacity constraints
Neutral context 0.96 (26 of 27) 1.00 (26 of 26)Fig. 2. Subject screen for P2 in the Bur
. Experimental results
.1. Description of the general results
The experimental data comprises the realized network struc-
ures for each period in 162 cycles (that is, 27 per condition). We
ssume that during each cycle, only one converged network could
e reached. In linewith the experiment conductedbyCallander and
lott (2005), a network is deﬁned as converged if the same conﬁg-
ration was chosen in three consecutive periods within the same
ycle. This conﬁguration does not necessarily need to be a pair-
ise stable network. More than one converged network appeared
n only two cycles. The ﬁrst converged network was then chosen
or the analyses.
Table 4 shows the proportion of networks that converged
ccording to network formation context and capacity constraint.
verall, 130 of the 162 experimental network formation processes
80.2%) converged. Convergence was more likely under high capac-
ty constraints (85.2%) than under low capacity constraints (75.3%).
n explanation for this discrepancy is that under high capacity con-
traints, the stable networks seem to be a bit easier to coordinate.
oreover, there was a learning effect, as convergence was more
ikely to occur in a later treatment within a session (between con-
ition differences) and in a later cycle within the same treatment
within condition differences). The percentage of networks that
onverged equaled 63.0% over all treatments that were played ﬁrst
uring a session, while this percentage was 93.5% for later treat-
ents within sessions. In addition, networks converged in 77.8% of
he ﬁrst cycles of a treatment, while convergence was reached in
6.1% of second or third cycles. More importantly, we also observed
ome differences across contexts: the probability of convergence
O
sontext with high capacity constraints.
eems to be higher in the neutral (88.9%) and Colemanian (85.2%)
ontexts than in the Burtian context (66.7%). Reaching a stable net-
ork appeared to be particularly difﬁculty in the Burtian context
nder low capacity constraints, and only happened in 51.9% of the
ases. These differences can be explained by the fact that the Bur-
ian context is conceptually perhaps the most complex context for
ubjects to grasp. Moreover, it is a hard context for subjects to coor-
inate in, as everyone would like to make a lot of ties but also triesBurtian context 0.82 (22 of 27) 0.86 (19 of 22)
Colemanian context 0.78 (21 of 27) 0.86 (18 of 21)
verall 0.80 (130 of 162) 0.88 (114 of 130)
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he Colemanian context under low capacity constraints, the pro-
ortion of converged networks that were also pairwise stable was
elatively low (only 60.0%). These non-pairwise stable networks
iffered often (in 93.8% of the cases) by only one tie from one of
he context-speciﬁc pairwise stable networks. For example, in the
olemanian context under low capacity constraints, in 9 out of
0 non-pairwise stable networks, 1 of the 6 subjects did not see
hat making the last tie, which would complete the full hexagon,
ould result in the creation of 4 additional closed triads (instead
f, for example, only one closed triad), when the other subject pro-
osed the last tie. These deviations were by far the most important
eason why convergence to one of the pairwise stable networks
id not happen in these cycles. Moreover, these deviations were
oncentrated within a few subjects, and therefore, single subject
ffects seem to play a role. If all of these nearly pairwise stable net-
orks were considered as pairwise stable network structures, over
9% of all converged structures corresponded to pairwise stable
etworks.
.2. Comparing network characteristics across social contexts
Now, we compare the network characteristics of the converged
etworks with the network characteristics of the predicted struc-
ures. We examine whether the predicted rank order (as presented
n Table 2) is correct (an overview is presented in Table 5). We per-
orm regressions for the relevant network characteristics on the six
ifferent conditions and use Wald tests to test whether the char-
cteristics differ between two speciﬁc conditions. The analyses are
lightly different from those on the simulations because, within
ne session, we have repeated observations from the same set of
ubjects. Therefore, we add a random effect at the session level,
lthough we think that the dependence between observations is
imited; within a session, there were always three groups playing
imultaneously, and the overlap of subjects between groups was
imited. This argument is conﬁrmed by the fact that the results







redicted and observed rank order by network characteristics, capacity constraint, and co
Predicted rank order Observed mean value (si
ow capacity constraints
Density 1. Colemanian 0.97
2. Neutral 0.79 (p<0.01)
3. Burtian 0.60 (p<0.01)
Proportion closed triads 1. Colemanian 0.91
2. Neutral 0.40 (p<0.01)
3. Burtian 0.00 (p<0.01)
Centralization 1. Neutral 0.11
2. Colemanian 0.13 (p=0.60)
3. Burtian 0.00 (p=0.03)
Segmentation 1. Colemanian 0.00
1. Neutral 0.05 (p=0.27)
1. Burtian 0.00 (p=0.35)
igh capacity constraints
Density 1. Colemanian 0.41
2. Neutral 0.40 (p=0.12)
2. Burtian 0.40 (p=0.74)
Proportion closed triads 1. Colemanian 0.11
2. Neutral 0.01 (p<0.01)
2. Burtian 0.00 (p=0.51)
Centralization 1. Burtian 0.05
1. Neutral 0.01 (p=0.45)
1. Colemanian 0.16 (p=0.01)
Segmentation 1. Colemanian 0.97
2. Neutral 0.43 (p<0.01)
3. Burtian 0.33 (p<0.01)
=Highest (e.g., highest expected density); 3 = lowest (e.g., lowest expected density).etworks 31 (2009) 63–75
e use robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering in
essions.
The results conﬁrmourhypothesis that, under lowcapacity con-
traints, the average density is larger in the Colemanian context
han in neutral networks, and in the neutral context it is again
arger than in the Burtian context. As can be seen in Table 5, all
he predicted differences are correct and signiﬁcant. Our hypothe-
es under high capacity constraints are only partly conﬁrmed, as
here appear to be no signiﬁcant differences between the three
ontexts, while we predicted a small difference between the Cole-
anian and the other two contexts. However, the relatively small
heoretical differencebetween thepredicteddensity in theColema-
ian context and the other two contexts implies that the power for
he test is rather small given the limited number of networks in the
xperiment.
With respect to the proportion of closed triads, our expecta-
ions hold under both low and high capacity constraints. Under
ow capacity constraints, there are clearly the most closed triads
n the Colemanian context, fewer in the neutral context, and even
ewer in the Burtian context. Under high capacity constraints, the
ast difference is not signiﬁcant, as was also predicted from the
imulation.
With respect to centralization, which can, as opposed to the
roportion of closed triads, be perceived merely as a byproduct
f goal-directed behavior instead of a direct consequence, part of
ur hypothesis is conﬁrmed. Under low capacity constraints, it was
redicted that more centralization would be found in the neutral
ontext, followed by the Colemanian and the Burtian contexts. In
ine with our expectations, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly less centralization
n the Burtian context than in the neutral and Colemanian con-
exts. However, there is no signiﬁcant difference with respect to
he amount of centralization between the Colemanian and neu-
ral contexts. Under high capacity constraints, the hypothesis that
entralization is equal across all three contexts does not hold.
nstead, we ﬁnd again the most centralization in the Colemanian
ontext, which is slightly higher than in Burtian networks and even
ntext.
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Table 6








expected (Fischer exact test)
Low capacity constraints
Neutral context Octahedron 0.82 0.34 Yes (p=0.00)
Burtian context 3,3-Complete bipartite 1 0.62 Yes (p=0.00)























































































ﬁndings of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) and Berninghaus et al. (2006,
2007) that subjects have a preference for equalizing payoffs in net-
work formation contexts.igh capacity constraints
Neutral context Hexagon 0.85
Burtian context Hexagon 1
Colemanian context Two triangles 0.90
igher compared to neutral networks. As we expected, Burtian and
eutral networks do not differ in terms of centralization. The over-
stimation of centralization under low capacity constraints in the
olemanian context can be attributed to the converged networks
hat were not pairwise stable due to the single actor deviations
iscussed above. Under the high capacity constraints, the Burtian
nd neutral networks are less centralized than expected, because
he more equal stable networks are more likely to be formed than
xpected, as we discuss below.
With respect to segmentation (which can also be strictly per-
eived as an unintended consequence of individual behavior), the
xpected rank orders are conﬁrmed for high capacity constraints.
egmentation is the highest in the Colemanian context, lower in
he neutral context, and the lowest in the Burtian context. Under
ow capacity constraints, segmentation does not differ signiﬁcantly
etween the contexts. In the Colemanian context as well as in the
urtian context, segmentation equals 0. Segmentation is slightly
igher in the neutral context, but is clearly not signiﬁcantly higher
ompared to the Burtian or the Colemanian contexts. The reason
or this is that some of the more segmented but unequal networks
n the Colemanian context that emerge in the simulation do not
merge in the experiment.
In sum, these experimental results provided two important
nsights. First, pairwise stability turns out to be a very good pre-
ictor for stability in the experimental network formation process.
s a consequence, we can conclude that social context matters. It
hapes the structure of networks through its effect on the incen-
ives and networking behavior of actors. Networking processes in
ifferent social contexts result in the emergence of different net-
ork structures because of the different incentives present across
ocial contexts. Second, the obtained rank orders and observed
etwork characteristics (density, proportion of closed triads, cen-
ralization, and segmentation) resemble the predicted rank orders
nd network characteristics from the simulation. However, there
re also some deviations from the predicted orderings, which
an, at least partly, be attributed to the fact that the predic-
ions of the likelihood that a speciﬁc stable network emerges do
ot always correspond with the likelihood of emergence in the
xperiment.
.3. The emergence of pairwise stable networks within conditions
As indicated above, the likelihood that speciﬁc stable networks
ill emerge in the experiment deviates from the probabilities as
redicted by the simulation. Table 6 shows which network is the
ost likely to emerge in the experiment. We label these networks
he dominant networks here. These results, ﬁrst of all, show that
he expected and observed dominant network structures are the
ame in ﬁve of the six treatments. As predicted, we ﬁnd under
ow capacity constraints the 3,3-complete bipartite network in the
urtian setting and the full hexagon in the Colemanian setting as








nd the hexagon in the neutral and Burtian contexts and the two
riangles in the Colemanian context to be the dominant stable con-
gurations. These observations not only hold when looking at the
bservedpairwise stable networks as derived from the simulations,
ut also when looking at all observed stable networks (including
he non-pairwise stable structures) from the experiment. In the
eutral network formation context, in which no dominant struc-
ure was predicted, the network converged 81.8% of the time to one
articular stable conﬁguration, the octahedron.
Still, all the dominant stable networks appear more often in the
xperiment than expected on the basis of the computer simula-
ions, as can also be inferred from Table 6. We tested whether the
redicted distribution of pairwise stable networks exactly resem-
les the observed distribution of stable networks by means of
Fisher’s exact test. We ﬁnd in almost all contexts (except for
he Colemanian context under low capacity constraints) that the
ominant stable network emerges signiﬁcantly more often in the
xperiment than in the simulation. In the Colemanian context with
owcapacity constraints, thenon-signiﬁcantdifference is due to the
lready very high expected number of times that the full hexagon
hould emerge in this condition. So, although the full hexagon was
he only emerging network in this condition in the experiment, the
ifference is not signiﬁcant.
As can be seen from Table 1, all the dominant networks are pair-
ise stable, equal, and efﬁcient. There is only one network that
ulﬁlls these conditions that is less likely to emerge, namely, the
wo closed triads in the neutral context with high capacity con-
traints. Still, that network also emerges at about the same rate in
he experiment as expected in the simulation (12%). Most pairwise
table networks that are either not efﬁcient or not equal emerge
t lower rates than expected by the simulation. Some networks
hat are unlikely in the simulation are observed incidentally in the
xperiment, but never at a signiﬁcantly higher rate than in the
imulation.
In sum, we ﬁnd that pairwise stable networks are almost the
nly networks that emerge in the experiment. In addition, we ﬁnd
hat the combination of a pairwise stable network being equal and
fﬁcient increases the likelihood that it will emerge. Other crite-
ia, however, do not make networks more likely to emerge, such as
eing only equal, or only efﬁcient.3 The focus of subjects on equal
nd efﬁcient pairwise stable networks is in accordance with the3 Also, stronger stability criteria such as strict pairwise stability (Gilles and
arangi, 2008) or unilateral stability (Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2008) do not predict
hich networks are more likely to occur in these contexts. In most cases, unilateral
tability coincides with pairwise stability, but in the Colemanian context with high
apacity constraints, the two closed triads are not unilaterally stable and are still the
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. Summary and conclusions
This paper started with the notion that since “networking” is
ncreasingly perceived as a means to reach personal goals, it is
atural to assume that actors try to arrange their ties strategically
o optimize their outcomes. Drawing on the sociological literature
escribing the best positions within networks, we compared two
heories of what the best way to build a network might be. While
urt’s (1992) theory on the advantages of brokerage indicates that
t is best to connect to individuals who are not connected to each
ther, Coleman’s theory on network closure emphasizes the value
f connecting to individuals who are already connected to each
ther. Whether we should strive for brokerage or closure may dif-
er across social contexts (PodolnyandBaron, 1997; FlapandVölker,
001). The main question is therefore not how to build your per-
onal network, but how to build your personal network given the
ontext you are in. Since incentives differ across social contexts, we
an expect the emergence of different types of network structures
cross different environments. To scrutinize this latter proposi-
ion, we compared the emergence of networks in three contexts:
neutral context, a Burtian context, and a Colemanian context.
hereas in the neutral context, actors do not have any preferential
ttachment, actors in the Burtian context prefer ties with uncon-
ected others, while actors in the Colemanian context prefer ties
ith connected others. We assumed that the incentives that we
mplemented for the different contexts were present in these con-
exts. The determination of precise incentives for speciﬁc contexts
s beyond the scope of this paper, but needs to be investigated in
urther research.
Focusing on six-actor networks with two different cost levels
or ties, the predicted differences in emerging network character-
stics were by and large conﬁrmed by the empirical data obtained
rom an experiment. Networks emerging in Colemanian contexts
an be characterized as dense networks with a relatively high pro-
ortion of closed triads, which tend to segment when tie costs
re high. The emergence of small cliques under high tie costs is
orth mentioning, as it may well shed some light on the founda-
ions of network segmentation in situations in which incentives
re cooperative in nature. On the contrary, networks evolving in a
urtian context are usually more sparse and have a small number
f closed triads. However, when tie costs are relatively low, net-
orks can still become rather dense. In any case, it turns out that
hen everyone wants to be in the center, there is no center (cf.
uskens and Van de Rijt, 2008). This indicates that the existence
f a broker is dependent on other actors who do not want to be
rokers. The network structures emerging from a neutral context
ften hold an intermediate position between the structures evolv-
ng inBurtian andColemanian contexts. Under high costs, networks
mbedded in a neutral context closely resemble network struc-
ures originating from a Burtian context. This means that when
he tie costs are high, not many closed triads form in a neutral
ontext. The observed differences sketched above should be pre-
ominantly perceived as a byproduct of individual behavior. Actors
o not directly strive for dense, decentralized, or segmented net-
orks, but these network features are unintended consequences of
oal-directed behavior.
In addition to studying the differences between contexts, we
lso investigated which stable networks are more likely to emerge
ithin a context. In earlier studies in which there were only
nequal stable networks (such as in the star networks in Falk
nd Kosfeld, 2003), network dynamics hardly stabilized. We dis-
overed in our contexts, in which there were always efﬁcient
nd equal pairwise stable networks, that these networks have a
ery high probability of being the emerging network. By setting
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sing a simulation, we systematically ﬁnd that human subjects are
ore likely than a simulation to choose equal and efﬁcient net-
orks as the preferred network. It is of future interest to study
etwork formationprocesses inwhich efﬁciency andequality argu-
ents do not co-occur to see, for example, whether networks
ith equal outcomes for everyone also emerge if they are not efﬁ-
ient.
Much work remains to be done to better understand network
ormation. For example, this article has been concerned with sit-
ations in which all actors have the same incentives conditional
pon the social context. Although homophily is not an uncommon
henomenon in social networks since similarity breeds connection
McPherson et al., 2001), some heterogeneity can still be expected
mong actors in networks, especially related to networking behav-
or and tie formation. Differences in actor characteristics might
ead to different valuations of network positions. Kalish and Robins
2006), for example, found that psychological predispositions are
n important determinant of the formation of personal networks.
n general, actors striving to bridge structural holes tend to be indi-
idualistic, neurotic, and control-minded, while actors striving for
etwork closure tend to identify themselves more with a group
nd are less individualistic. However, networking is not only about
ncentives, but also about having, seeing, and exploiting oppor-
unities. Since some people are better at constructing personal
etworks than others because they have better networking skills,
his might also cause differences in networking behavior. Like-
ise, different social contexts may attract different kinds of actors.
urtian contexts may attract or keep hold of actors that are savoir-
aire brokers, while Colemanian contexts may be a magnet for
ctors who are good at managing the demands of closed networks
r strong ties. Accordingly, the optimization of network positions
ecomes inherently intertwined with speciﬁc actor properties.
hese elements are difﬁcult to incorporate in an experimental set-
ing and call for more real-world research on network formation
cross various social contexts.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in many real-life settings,
enot onlyﬁndheterogeneous arguments fornetworkingbetween
ctors, but also for individual actors, as it is often beneﬁcial to rely
n both strong and weak ties (closure and brokerage). Gargiulo
nd Benassi (2000), for example, conclude that there is a trade-
ff between the safety of cooperation within cohesive networks
nd the ﬂexibility provided by networks rich in structural holes.
zzi (1996) deﬁnes this as the paradox of embeddedness: individ-
al networks should have at least some degree of cohesion, but
verembeddedness (a network that is too dense) saturates the net-
orks. This heterogeneity of preferences within actors originates
ot only from the fact that individuals act in many social contexts,
ut also that many social contexts are often characterized as being
eterogeneous. One can think here of a close-knit group of friends
ho support each other, but are at the same time ﬁshing in the
ame pool of potential life partners. Since these friends share in
arge part the same social environment, they are likely to meet the
ame people, which in turn may cause friction. Likewise, we ﬁnd in
anybusinesses the coexistenceofﬁerce competitionand strategic
lliances. As Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996: 4) put it, “busi-
ess is cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition
hen it comes to dividing it up.” Companies switch easily between
ompetition and cooperation, which seem to be two extremes on a
ontinuum along which companies continuously move. However,
n order to analyze network formation in such settings, we should
xamine more thoroughly the interplay between competition and
ooperation in thesenetworks.Whendoes competition change into
ooperation and vice versa, and how does this affect the struc-
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ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
n the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2008.10.001.
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